The point of normative models in judgment and decision making by Jonathan Baron
OPINION ARTICLE
published: 24 December 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00577
The point of normative models in judgment and
decision making
Jonathan Baron*
Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
*Correspondence: baron@psych.upenn.edu
Edited by:
Shira Elqayam, De Montfort University, UK
In this comment, I shall try to summarize
arguments that I havemade before (Baron,
1985, 1994, 2004, 2006, 2008). These argu-
ments are my attempt to state the standard
view in the field of judgment and decision
making (JDM).
JDM is applied psychology. The ulti-
mate goal is to improve judgments and
decisions, or keep them from getting
worse. In order to achieve this goal we
need to know what good judgments and
decisions are. That is, we need criteria
for evaluation, so that we can gather data
on the goodness of judgments, find out
what makes them better or worse, and test
method for improving them when there is
room for improvement. This is the main
function of normative models.
Examples of normative models in
JDM are:
1. For quantitative judgments (e.g., pop-
ulations of cities, proportions of coin
tosses that were heads): the nor-
mative model is simply the right
answers. This also applies to rela-
tive judgments (which city has more
people?) or judgments of category
membership. We can also quantify
departures from the right answers in
various ways.
2. For judgments of the probability of
unique events, one type of normative
model, which is applied to a group of
such judgments, scores the judgments
by distance from 0 (no) or 1 (yes) and
applies some formula to these scores. A
related approach is to aggregate judg-
ments with the same stated probabil-
ity (e.g., all those with 80%), and ask
if the proportion is correct (calibration,
the proposition should be true 80% of
the time).
3. Alternatively, for probabilities of related
unique events, we can assess their
coherence, their agreement with each
other. If you say that the probability
is 0.6 that X will win a competition
and 0.7 that Y will win, you are not
coherent.
4. For decisions, we can sometimes assess
their consistency with basic principles
of decision making, such as domi-
nance (if A is better than B in some
respects and worse in no respects,
then choose A).
5. More typically, we assess the coher-
ence of sets of decisions, using a math-
ematical model to define coherence,
such as expected-utility theory or expo-
nential discounting (for decisions over
time). “Utility” is a summary measure
of “good(ness).”
We could, in principle, define normative
models in terms of the behavioral steps
involved in making a good judgment or
decision. For example, we could define
the normative model for subtraction prob-
lems in terms of the steps of subtracting
digits, regrouping, etc. But, as just illus-
trated, most normative models in JDM do
not do this and are thus not computa-
tional, in the sense of being specified as
procedures.
Note that some normative models con-
cern coherence of responses with each
other while others concern correspon-
dence with the world, a distinction made
first by Hammond (1996) [see Dunwoody
(2009), for an overview]. Correspondence-
type models are usually difficult to apply to
decisions, so that are used mostly for judg-
ments. This because the “right answer” to
a decision question usually depends on the
values of the decision maker.
JDM makes distinctions among
three types of models: normative,
descriptive, and prescriptive. The
three-way distinction emerged clearly in
the 1980s (Freeling, 1984; Baron, 1985;
Bell et al., 1988—all of whom wrote inde-
pendently of each other), although various
parts of it were implicit in the writing of
Herbert Simon and many philosophers
(such as J. S. Mill).
Normative models, as noted, are
standards for evaluation. They must be
justified independently of observations of
people’s judgments and decisions, once we
have observed enough to define what we
are talking about. When not obvious, as
in the case of simple correspondence (the
“right answer”), they are typically justi-
fied by philosophical and mathematical
argument (Baron, 2004). Particularly in
cases where we want to quantify devia-
tions from the single best response, several
normative models may apply to the same
case (e.g., scoring rules for probability
judgments).
Descriptive models are psychological
theories that try to explain how people
make judgments and decisions, typically
in the language of cognitive psychology,
which includes such concepts as heuristics
and strategies, as well as formal mathe-
matical models. Within the three-model
framework, descriptive models are most
useful when they explain departures from
normative models, so researchers often
focus on the search for such explana-
tions. Such models allow us to determine
whether, and, if so, how, wemight improve
judgments and decisions. When a devia-
tion from a normative model is found to
be systematic, not just the result of random
error, we call it a bias. For example, peo-
ple are biased to choose default options,
even when others are normatively equal or
better.
Prescriptive models are designs for
improvement. If normative models fall
in the domain of philosophy (broadly
defined) and descriptive models in the
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domain of empirical psychological science,
then prescriptive models are in the domain
of engineering (again, broadly defined).
Originally, they were conceived as includ-
ing mathematical tools that were use-
ful for the formal analysis of decisions.
These constitute the field of decision anal-
ysis, which includes several methods (and
which has a society and a journal by that
name). But prescriptive models can also be
educational interventions (Larrick, 2004),
which, for example, teach people alterna-
tive heuristics, to counteract heuristics that
lead to biases.
A recent addition to the arsenal of pre-
scriptive methods is the idea of “decision
architecture” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008),
which consists of designing the presenta-
tion of decisions to those who will make
them in such a way as to help people
make the normatively better choice. A clas-
sic example is using the fact that peo-
ple are biased toward the default to help
them choose wisely by making what is
usually the wise choice the default. For
example, use a diversified portfolio as the
default retirement plan for new employ-
ees (as opposed to, say, shares in company
stock).
Thus, the ideal plan for JDM, some-
times actually realized (Baron, 2008;
Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), is to apply
normative models to judgments and deci-
sions, looking for possible biases, then
use the tools of psychology to under-
stand the nature of those biases, and
then, in the light of this understanding,
develop approaches to improve mat-
ters. Of course, in real life these steps
are not sequential, but are informed by
each other. For example, decision analysis
turns out to require the measurement
of personal probability and utility, so
now a large descriptive and normative
enterprise is devoted to this measurement
problem,which has produced better meth-
ods for measurement, which, in turn, are
used to improve the original prescriptive
models.
This plan clearly requires that the three
elements are kept distinct. Suppose, for
example, we make arguments for norma-
tive models on the basis of (descriptive)
observations of what people do, under the
assumption that people are rational. Then,
we are likely to conclude that people are
rational and that no prescriptive interven-
tions are needed. The field of JDM would
tend to disappear. Arguably, economics as
a field made this assumption of rational-
ity and thus was never concerned with
helping people to make better economic
choices, until recently, when economics
has started to take the findings of JDM
very seriously.
Another danger that JDM tries to avoid
is to design prescriptive interventions
without at least some clarity about norma-
tive and descriptive models. Specifically,
we try to avoid “fixing things that ain’t
broke.” This sort of prescription has hap-
pened in psychology. For example, it
was assumed that creativity was limited
by a lack of divergent thinking (“think-
ing outside the box”), and many pro-
grams to improve creativity assumed this,
despite the fact that the evidence indi-
cate quite clearly that this was not a
common problem [e.g., Johnson et al.
(1968); and see Perkins (1981), for an
overview].
Much of the debate within JDM is
about the seriousness of various purported
biases. Although strong advocates on one
side or the other tend to think either that
people are hopelessly biased or that we
are perfectly adapted to our environment,
more moderate folks think that, while it all
depends on the person, the situation, and
the task, there really are some situations
where people can be helped, sometimes
a lot, through the JDM approach (Thaler
and Sunstein, 2008).
We need to keep normative and pre-
scriptive models separate as well. If
we assume that normative models are
also prescriptive, they may become self-
defeating. In decision making, the main
normative standard is the maximization of
(expected) utility, and the time required
for calculation usually reduces utility. If
normative models require elaborate calcu-
lation, then, when a real person attempts
to apply one to a decision, the utility loss
from the time spent may be greater than
the gain from using the model, as opposed
to some simpler heuristic. In many cases,
then, normative models are applied by
researchers, and real people may use var-
ious heuristics to improve their judgments
as evaluated by the normative models (e.g.,
Davis-Stober et al., 2010).
On the other hand, summary versions
of normative models may require no cal-
culation at all and may serve the purpose
of focusing attention on only what is rele-
vant. For example, utilitarianism, a variant
of utility theory that applies to decisions
that affect many people, says that the goal
of such decisions is to maximize total util-
ity. A real person can often save time by
simply asking, “Which option produces
the best outcome on the whole, consider-
ing effects on everyone?” (Baron, 1990).
Such a question is often easy to answer,
and it can avoid more elaborate reasoning
when, for example, this simple principle
is must be weighed against another, non-
utilitarian, principle such as “Do not use
one person as a means to help another.”
This conflict may occur in decisions about
whether to abort a fetus, which would die
anyway, in order to save the mother’s life.
When the fetal death is caused by abor-
tion, then it is a means, and Catholic moral
doctrine has been interpreted as prohibit-
ing abortion for this reason, despite its
obvious utilitarian benefit. The utilitar-
ian solution is simpler because it involves
only one principle and the decision maker
does not need to resolve the conflict with
another.
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